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able or if the court made its order without reference to a prior agreement of the
parties then there would be no bar to modification under California Civil Code
section 139.
As we have observed, the courts have been careful to point out that a judgment
or order for alimony or child support may only be modified as to future pay-
ments, 35 and the court exercises its discretion only in respect to enforcement.36
In a modification proceeding, the husband in order to qualify for a reduction in
the amount awarded, must generally show a decreased ability to make payments.37
It might well prove impossible to adequately distinguish between this economic
ability on the one hand and economic hardship on the other. For this reason, it is
submitted that unless the success of an execution appears to be in doubt, the courts
of California will not attempt to deny issuance of a writ merely upon a showing
by the husband of financial hardship.
In summary, we have seen that prior to the Messenger case courts regarded
the granting of execution "as a matter of right."38 Yet, the installment judgment,
fair and reasonable at its inception, seemed not always able to contemplate the
future misadventures of erstwhile spouses, thus forcing the courts to warily exer-
cise their discretion to prevent obvious injustices. When an award for alimony and
child support was granted in a non-segregated amount, the husband could readily
obtain a prospective modification either when the wife remarried or when the child
reached majority.3 9 But when he did not avail himself of this simple expedient,
the fact remained that it would not be just for him to pay when the need had van-
ished. And if a wife's family or subsequent husband had supported the child in
whose favor the award was made, it would hardly have been equitable for the wife
to reap the benefit of an execution when she had expended nothing in support of
the child. 40 Also, where a husband had paid a lump sum to cover future install-
ments and had in no way tried to avoid his obligations, surely there could have
been no justice in later demanding of him an accounting for the installments. 41
The Messenger case goes a step farther. Now, the court may exercise its dis-
cretion in behalf of the husband even though there be no doubt as to the wife's
right. If the husband is in such economic straits that the issuance of a writ would
serve no purpose but to impair his earning capacity, he may now expect the court
to view his predicament with some charity and allow him time to solve his prob-
lems without being subjected to harrassment.
John S. Mead
EQUITY: INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER STATE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
Plaintiff, a Negro woman, sought but was denied admission to an amusement
park. The sole basis for the exclusion was the plaintiff's color. Plaintiff, relying on
the Ohio Civil Rights Statutes,' brought an action for an injunction to enjoin de-
fendant from refusing her admittance because of her color. The Ohio Supreme
35 See note 26 supra.
36 Ibid.
37 16 CAL. JTJR.2d, Divorce and Separation § 216 (1954).
38 See note 18 supra.
39 See note 30 supra.
40 See note 29 supra.
41 See note 27 supra.
1 Onio Rxv. CODE §§ 2901.35-.36.
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Court in Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc.2 denied the injunction on the ground that
the statutory remedies were exclusive.
At common law, it was well-settled that except for innkeepers and common
carriers, who were under a duty to serve the general public without discrimination,
proprietors of private enterprises enjoyed an absolute power to serve whom they
pleased. 3 Because the United States Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases4 held
that Congress was powerless to secure equal accommodations in cases of "private
action," some states enacted Civil Rights Statutes which were designed to accom.
plish what Congress could not. That this was the intent of the states may be seen
by noting that the invalidated federal statute served as a model for the state
statutes.5 The legislative intent is further borne out by the observation that the
state courts have almost universally held that the application of the statutes is
limited to discrimination on account of race or color.6 This was also the interpre-
tation of the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases.
The first problem facing the courts is determining the purview of the statutes;
that is, a determination of which "establishments" were intended to be affected by
the legislation requiring accommodations. In the respect, the statutes are not uni-
form, and therefore there is variance in the cases merely as a matter of statutory
terminology. Moreover, the courts are influenced by the rule of statutory con-
struction that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly con-
strued.7 However, the statutes, in general, purport to effect equal accommoda-
tions in "places of public accommodation or amusement" and generally include
a "catch-all" phase to that effect after the statutory enumeration of establish-
ments. As a result, the cases present two views as the scope of the statutes. One
view applies the rule of ejusdem generis8 (i.e., to those places of the same general
characters as those specifically enumerated), while a second view holds that ejus-
dem generis is inapplicable where the places specifically enumerated are diverse
in character. 9
The main problem arising under the statutes is in regard to the remedies avail-
able to the aggrieved person. Clearly, the statutory remedies are available, but
here again the statutes are not uniform. Most statutes give a right of action for
damages or impose a criminal penalty,10 while other statutes provide that viola-
tion of the statute results only in criminal liability."' However, no statute has been
found which provides for injunctive relief as an alternative remedy. The question
thus posed is: should equity grant relief in these cases?
Relatively few cases have raised this issue under the Civil Rights Statutes, and
2 165 Ohio St. 200, 134 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
3 10 Am. JuiR., Civil Rights § 17 (1937).
4 109 U.S. 3 (1893).
5 10 Am. J m., op. cit. supra note 3. The statutes have universally been upheld against
constitutional attack as valid exercises of the police power. Jones v. Kehrlein, 49 CalApp. 646,
194 Pac. 55 (1920).
6 1 A.L.R.2d 1165 (1948). California has held to the contrary pursuant to statutes (CAL.
Civ. Cooa §§ 51-54) broad in their language. See Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal.2d
110, 180 Pac.2d 321 (1947) ; Piluso v. Spencer, 36 CalApp. 416, 172 Pac. 412 (1918).
7 14 CJ.S., Civil Rights § 3 (1939).
8 Cecil v. Green, 161 Il. 265, 43 N.E. 1105 (1896) ; Burks v. Bosso, 180 N.Y. 341, 73 N.E.
58 (1905).
9 Darius v. Apostolos, 68 Colo. 323, 190 Pac. 510 (1920).
10 171 A.L.R. 920 (1947).
11 Ibid.
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most courts have denied injunctive relief. 12 However, some of these cases may be
explainable on the basis that the plaintiff was not within the class protected,
i.e., the discrimination was not based on color.13 The courts, nevertheless, invari-
ably state as reasons for denial of relief one of two grounds, or both, namely: (1)
that the statutory remedies are exclusive,' 4 or (2) that equity will not protect
purely personal rights.15
As a general rule, most courts have held that the statutory remedies are not
exclusive in actions under the Civil Rights Statutes.16 Most of these cases, how-
ever, were actions for damages where the statute provided only for a criminal
penalty. Where injunctive relief is prayed for, the courts are more inclined to assert
the strict construction rule. Thus, in the Fletcher case, where the statute provided
for damages or criminal penalty, the court disposed of the case with the following
words:
"In summary, the decision in this case rests squarely on the proposition that at com-
mon law those who own and operate private places of amusement and entertainment
can admit or exclude whomsoever they please, and that, since such establishments are
open to all only through legislative enactments, those enactments govern the situation,
and where as a part of those enactments a specific remedy or penalty is prescribed for
their violation, such remedy is exclusive .... 17
This court, then, as some others have done,' 8 simply refused to go into the
merits of injunctive relief, and for practical purposes "washed its hands" of the
issue. Is this position defensible? As a basic proposition, the rule that if deroga-
tion of the common law are to be strictly construed is one of general, but not uni-
versal application.19 It is axiomatic that in construing statutes the purpose of the
court is to give effect to the legislative intent.20 As noted above, it seems certain
that the purpose of the Civil Rights Statutes is to secure equal accommodations
to those persons contemplated by the enactments.21 As the dissenting opinion in
the principal case points out, to impute a legislative purpose of compelling a person
to accept from a wrongdoer money as a substitute (for specific enforcement) is
"to sustain . . . an absurdity and impugn the integrity of the legislature which
enacted the statute. '12 2 Certainly, the inadequacy of the statutory remedies is
apparent in these cases, for it is certain that specific enjoyment provides the only
real remedy to the aggrieved individual. It should also be noted that a criminal
prosecution is not a private remedy, but that of the State.23 Therefore, as in the
12 See notes 13, 14, 15 infra.
13 See White v. Pasfield, 212 Ill.App. 73 (1918) ; Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club,
Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1941) ; Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 153 N.Y. 449,
47 N.E. 896 (1897); Woolcott v. Shubert, 154 N.Y.S. 643 (1915).
14 Bailey v. Washington Theatre Co., 218 Ind. 513, 34 N.E.2d 17 (1941); Madden v.
Queens County jockey Club, Inc., 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1941).
15 White v. Pasfield, 212 Ill.App. 73 (1918).
16 Bolden v. Grand Rapids Operating Corp., 239 Mich. 318, 214 N.W. 241 (1927) ; Fer-
guson v. Gies, 82 Mich. 358, 46 N.W. 718 (1890); Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114
Wash. 24, 194 Pac. 813 (1921); Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, infra note 26; Everett v.
Harron, infra note 30.
17 165 Ohio St. at 204, 134 N.E.2d at 375 (1956).
18 See notes 13, 14, 15 supra.
19 50 Am. JUR., Statutes, § 402 (1944).
20 50 Am. JUR., Statutes, § 404 (1944).
21 See notes 5 and 6 supra.
22 165 Ohio St. at 206, 134 N.E.2d at 377 (1956).
2 CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIMES § 2 (5th ed. 1952).
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principal case, to compel the plaintiff to pursue the statutory remedies is, in effect,
to leave him only the private remedy of an action for damages. The fact that statu-
tory recoveries are generally small once again points up the acute inadequacy of
remedy.
The second main objection against granting injunctive relief is based upon the
rule that equity will not protect purely personal rights. While many courts still
pay "lip-service" to this much criticized rule, the readiness of courts to find some
illusory "property right" indicates that the rule is more apparent than real.24 In-
deed, the tendency of modem courts is to state frankly that purely personal rights
will be protected by equity.25 The California Supreme Court in Orloff v. Los An-
geles Turf Club,26 squarely faced the issue here involved and said:
"The issue should not in logic or justice turn upon the sole proposition that a per-
sonal rather than a property right is involved. To so reason, is to place property rights
in a more .favorable position than personal rights .... These concepts of the sanctity
of personal rights are specifically protected by the constitution, both state and federal,
and the courts have properly given them a place of high dignity and worth of especial
protection.127
In the light of such cogent reasoning, it is difficult to see how the "property right"
argument can now be successfully urged upon a court in civil rights cases. Al-
though the court in the Fletcher case expressly refused to follow the Orloff case,
the holding was expressly limited to the point involving statutory construction.
As this writer has attempted to point out above, the two main objections stated
by courts which deny injunctive relief appear to be "escape-valve" mechanisms.
That such grounds should be given in cases where the need for equitable relief is
so pronounced would seem to indicate that a more fundamental reason underlies
the decisions in these cases. Although not stated in the cases, the real reason seems
to be: assuming that injunctive relief is in fact the only adequate remedy, would
it solve the problem even if it were granted. It is obvious that the courts are being
asked to compel the exercise of equal treatment. The intrinsic difficulties involved
may well be appreciated. This problem of "practicability of enforcement" has been
pointed out by Walsh, where in discussing injunctive relief in "personal rights"
cases, he has stated that the principal arguments against equitable intervention
are: (1) that the effectiveness of equitable relief is of doubtful result and hence
will make the court the object of ridicule, and (2) that granting of equitable relief
would place a heavy burden upon the courts by inviting a deluge of "petty"
grievances. 28
It can hardly be said that seeking enforcement of a civil right is a "petty"
matter, but the "practicability" objection would appear to be a cogent argument
against the granting of equitable relief. We may suppose two extremes, one where
mere admission to an establishment is the primary purpose, as for example, to view
a horse race; the other, where many personal services would be involved, for ex-
ample, in a restaurant. In the latter example, it is clear that numerous opportu-
nities to circumvent the injunction are present.
24 See, e.g., Blanton v. Blanton, 163 Ga. 361, 136 S.E. 141 (1926). See also 50 HARv. L.
REV. 171 (1936).25 Kenyon v. City of Chicopee, 320 Mass. 528, 70 N.R.2d 241 (1946) ; Everett v. Harron,
infra note 30.
26 30 Cal.2d 110, 180 Pac.2d 321 (1947).
2730 Cal.2d at 117, 180 Pac.2d at 325 (1947).
28WA.Ls, EQUIY § 52 (1930).
NOTES
In two recent cases where injunctive relief was granted under Civil Rights
Statutes, no problems of enforcement were involved. In Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf
Club2 an injunction was granted to compel admission to a racetrack. In the more
recent case of Everett v. Harron3 ° an injunction was granted to compel admission
of Negroes to a public park. The significance of the Everett case seems to lie in
the following statement:
"We believe the true rule to be that equity will protect personal rights by injunc-
tion upon the same conditions upon which it will protect property rights by injunction.
In general, these conditions are, that unless relief is granted a substantial right of the
plaintiff will be impaired to a material degree; that the remedy of law is inadequate;
and that injunctive relief can be applied with practical success and without imposing
an impossible burden on the court or bringing its processes into disrepute.' 3 1 (Em-
phasis added.)
On the basis of the Orloff case, it is difficult to anticipate to what extent Cali-
fornia courts will grant injunctive relief when faced with more complex fact situ-
ations. The California courts, however, have consistently construed the Civil
Rights Statutes liberally.32 In the Orloff case, the court expressly rejected both the
"property right" and the strict construction rule objections, and therefore, it
would appear that California courts would be bound to inquire only into the merits
of injunctive relief, as such.
It is submitted that the majority of courts in denying injunctive relief have
refused to come to grips with the real problem involved, and in refusing to go into
the merits for equitable relief, have denied the only effective means of enforcing
rights granted by the Civil Rights Statutes. It is not suggested here that an injunc-
tion should issue in every case, but only that the courts should at least inquire
whether in any specific case, the injunction would be effective. While this may
necessarily involve a case to case approach, it would be a long step in the direction
of effecting the legislative intent.
If the analysis presented here is correct, it would seem that the court in the
Fletcher case avoided the crucial issue and denied injunctive relief under facts
obviously amenable to such relief. In conclusion, it may be said that a reappraisal
by the state courts is desirable. While some judicial restraint may be necessary in
specific situations, it would seem that a "right" deemed sufficiently important to
be given express sanction by the legislature is entitled to effective protection by
injunction if practicable under the circumstances. 33
Rudolph Limon
29 See note 26 supra.
30 380 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383 (1955).
31380 Pa. at 127, 110 A.2d at 387 (1955).
32 See 35 CALIF. L. REv. 571 (1947).
33 The courts have readily granted injunctive relief in cases involving federal civil rights.
Draper v. St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. Mo. 1950); Law v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 346 (D. Md. 1948). Although many cases have arisen under Federal
Statutes providing for equitable relief as an alternative remedy, such relief is discretionary,
not mandatory. Fleming v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 128 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1942).
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